Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings

This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted
work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because
go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched
by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits.

Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted):
- Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no
  SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck,
  sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041).
- Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of
  their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent
  extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI).
- IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics.

Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production):
- Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...)
  in the raw-SQL query escape hatch.
- High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent
  extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow
  or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against
  internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time;
  alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on
  mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped
  goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753).
- Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers
  (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy)
  on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's
  config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on
  docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps
  (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected
  Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net
  vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow
  running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing
  license-compliance.yml matrix shape.
- Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell
  history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag
  for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt
  comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration
  side-channel.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-18 23:53:20 -07:00
parent d2bb9de245
commit 4b5dae5879
87 changed files with 5095 additions and 164 deletions
+261
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
package localauth
import (
"encoding/json"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/sentry/sentry/api/authz"
)
func newTestHandler(t *testing.T, fs *fakeStore) (*Handler, *http.ServeMux) {
t.Helper()
authorizer := NewAuthorizer(fs)
h := NewHandler(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)), fs, authorizer, time.Hour, CookieConfig{})
mux := http.NewServeMux()
h.RegisterRoutes(mux)
return h, mux
}
func doRequest(t *testing.T, mux *http.ServeMux, method, path, body string, cookie *http.Cookie) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
t.Helper()
var r io.Reader
if body != "" {
r = strings.NewReader(body)
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, r)
if cookie != nil {
req.AddCookie(cookie)
}
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
mux.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
return rec
}
func mustCreateUser(t *testing.T, fs *fakeStore, username, password string, role authz.Role) *User {
t.Helper()
hash, err := HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("hashing password: %v", err)
}
u, err := fs.CreateUser(t.Context(), username, hash, role)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("creating user: %v", err)
}
return u
}
func sessionCookieFrom(rec *httptest.ResponseRecorder) *http.Cookie {
for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
if c.Name == sessionCookieName {
return c
}
}
return nil
}
func TestLoginSuccess(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
rec := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"hunter22"}`, nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(rec)
if cookie == nil || cookie.Value == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected a session cookie to be set, got none")
}
if !cookie.HttpOnly {
t.Errorf("session cookie must be HttpOnly")
}
var resp sessionResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if resp.Token == "" {
t.Errorf("expected the response body to also carry the raw token for non-browser callers")
}
if resp.Role != "editor" {
t.Errorf("role = %q, want editor", resp.Role)
}
}
func TestLoginWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
rec := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"wrong"}`, nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestLoginUnknownUserSameErrorAsWrongPassword(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
unknown := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"bob","password":"whatever"}`, nil)
wrongPass := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"wrong"}`, nil)
if unknown.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized || wrongPass.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("both must be 401, got unknown=%d wrongPass=%d", unknown.Code, wrongPass.Code)
}
if unknown.Body.String() != wrongPass.Body.String() {
t.Errorf("responses must be identical (no username enumeration): unknown=%q wrongPass=%q", unknown.Body.String(), wrongPass.Body.String())
}
}
func TestSessionRequiresAuth(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
rec := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/session", "", nil)
if rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 401 with no session cookie", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestLoginThenSessionRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
login := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"hunter22"}`, nil)
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(login)
sess := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/session", "", cookie)
if sess.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body=%s", sess.Code, sess.Body.String())
}
var resp sessionResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(sess.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if resp.Username != "alice" {
t.Errorf("username = %q, want alice", resp.Username)
}
}
func TestLogoutInvalidatesSession(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
login := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"hunter22"}`, nil)
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(login)
logout := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/logout", "", cookie)
if logout.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("logout status = %d, want 204", logout.Code)
}
sess := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/session", "", cookie)
if sess.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("status after logout = %d, want 401 (session must be revoked)", sess.Code)
}
}
func TestNonOwnerCannotManageUsers(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "alice", "hunter22", authz.RoleEditor)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
login := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"alice","password":"hunter22"}`, nil)
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(login)
rec := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/users", "", cookie)
if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 403 for a non-owner listing users", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestOwnerCanCreateAndDeleteUsers(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "admin", "adminpass1", authz.RoleOwner)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
login := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"admin","password":"adminpass1"}`, nil)
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(login)
create := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/users", `{"username":"bob","password":"bobspassword","role":"viewer"}`, cookie)
if create.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("create status = %d, want 201; body=%s", create.Code, create.Body.String())
}
var created userResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(create.Body.Bytes(), &created); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if created.Role != "viewer" {
t.Errorf("role = %q, want viewer", created.Role)
}
if created.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
t.Errorf("created_at was not populated in the create response")
}
list := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/users", "", cookie)
var users []userResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(list.Body.Bytes(), &users); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if len(users) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len(users) = %d, want 2 (admin + bob)", len(users))
}
del := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodDelete, "/auth/users/"+created.ID, "", cookie)
if del.Code != http.StatusNoContent {
t.Fatalf("delete status = %d, want 204", del.Code)
}
}
func TestCreateUserRejectsShortPassword(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "admin", "adminpass1", authz.RoleOwner)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
login := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"admin","password":"adminpass1"}`, nil)
cookie := sessionCookieFrom(login)
rec := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/users", `{"username":"bob","password":"short"}`, cookie)
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 400 for a too-short password", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestResetPasswordRevokesExistingSessions(t *testing.T) {
fs := newFakeStore()
mustCreateUser(t, fs, "admin", "adminpass1", authz.RoleOwner)
bob := mustCreateUser(t, fs, "bob", "bobspassword", authz.RoleViewer)
_, mux := newTestHandler(t, fs)
adminLogin := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"admin","password":"adminpass1"}`, nil)
adminCookie := sessionCookieFrom(adminLogin)
bobLogin := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/login", `{"username":"bob","password":"bobspassword"}`, nil)
bobCookie := sessionCookieFrom(bobLogin)
reset := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodPost, "/auth/users/"+bob.ID+"/reset-password", "", adminCookie)
if reset.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("reset status = %d, want 200; body=%s", reset.Code, reset.Body.String())
}
var resp resetPasswordResponse
if err := json.Unmarshal(reset.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decoding response: %v", err)
}
if resp.Password == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected a generated password in the response when none was supplied")
}
stale := doRequest(t, mux, http.MethodGet, "/auth/session", "", bobCookie)
if stale.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("bob's pre-reset session status = %d, want 401 (reset must revoke existing sessions)", stale.Code)
}
}