Add local login, agent extra log paths, IPv4/IPv6 metrics; remediate security audit findings
This is a large squashed commit covering two batches of prior uncommitted work plus a full security-audit remediation pass, kept together because go.mod/go.sum and several shared files (main.go, handler.go) were touched by both and splitting risked non-building intermediate commits. Features (built earlier, previously uncommitted): - Local username/password login for single-tenant deployments with no SSO configured (api/localauth, alerting/internal/sessioncheck, sentryctl users, web/src/routes/login, metadata migrations 0040/0041). - Remotely-editable additional log file paths for agents, on top of their existing primary source (api/agents, agent/sentry-agent extra-file-path diffing, web agent config UI). - IPv4/IPv6 addresses reported alongside other host system metrics. Security audit remediation (this pass, all live-verified in production): - Critical: block ClickHouse SSRF table functions (url/remote/file/s3/...) in the raw-SQL query escape hatch. - High: deny sensitive paths and require Admin to add agent extra_file_paths (Editor could previously point an agent at /etc/shadow or an SSH key); alerting webhook targets now validate against internal/metadata/loopback addresses, both at creation and send time; alerting's session middleware now enforces an Editor+ floor on mutating requests instead of "any authenticated session"; bumped goxmldsig to close a SAML signature-verification bypass (GO-2026-4753). - Medium: per-IP login rate limiting; security response headers (HSTS/CSP/nosniff/X-Frame-Options/Referrer-Policy/Permissions-Policy) on web/nginx.conf; a DevCredentialWarnings check in every Go service's config loader, logging loudly at startup if a deployment is still on docker-compose.yml's literal dev-only credentials; dependency bumps (golang.org/x/text, grpc, x/net, quick-xml, h2) across every affected Go module and both Rust crates, including a previously-uncovered x/net vulnerability in deploy/operator; a new security-scan.yml CI workflow running cargo-deny/govulncheck/npm-audit, mirroring the existing license-compliance.yml matrix shape. - Low: removed sentryctl's plaintext --password flag (shell history/`ps` exposure) in favor of stdin and a --password-stdin flag for reset-password's optional specific-password path; a dummy bcrypt comparison closes a login response-time username-enumeration side-channel.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
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package sessioncheck
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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)
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// sessionCookieName must match api/localauth's sessionCookieName
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// exactly (unexported there too, deliberately duplicated rather than
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// imported -- see this package's doc comment) -- the same cookie
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// api/localauth.Handler.setCookie writes, scoped (via SESSION_COOKIE_
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// DOMAIN) to cover both api's and alerting's subdomains in production.
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const sessionCookieName = "sentry_local_session"
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type errorResponse struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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}
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func writeUnauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errorResponse{Error: "unauthorized"})
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}
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func writeForbidden(w http.ResponseWriter) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
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_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(errorResponse{Error: "forbidden"})
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}
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// mutatingRoleFloor is the minimum role RequireSession enforces for any
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// non-read request -- closes a real gap the security audit found: this
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// package used to be a pure "logged in or not" gate with no role check
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// at all, meaning a Viewer-role session could create/delete alert rules
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// and notification targets exactly like an Editor. GET/HEAD (read-only)
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// stay at "any valid session," matching every role floor in this
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// codebase's other RBAC-gated resources (queries, dashboards) using
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// Viewer as their read bar.
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const mutatingRoleFloor = "editor"
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func isReadOnly(method string) bool {
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return method == http.MethodGet || method == http.MethodHead
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}
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func credentialFromRequest(r *http.Request) string {
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if auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); auth != "" {
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const prefix = "Bearer "
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if len(auth) > len(prefix) && auth[:len(prefix)] == prefix {
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return auth[len(prefix):]
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}
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}
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if cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil {
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return cookie.Value
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}
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return ""
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}
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// RequireSession wraps next so every request needs a valid local-login
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// session -- a blanket gate, not per-route roles: alerting has no
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// role-check plumbing at all today (unlike api/authz's per-route
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// RequireRole), and building a full parallel system just for this
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// feature is out of scope (see /docs/agent-management-design.md-style
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// "resist scope creep" discipline this codebase applies everywhere).
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// GET /healthz is deliberately exempt -- Docker's HEALTHCHECK execs
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// this same binary against itself over loopback (cmd/alerting/main.go's
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// runHealthcheck), pre-auth, and must keep working regardless of
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// whether local auth is enabled.
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func RequireSession(checker *Checker, next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.URL.Path == "/healthz" {
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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return
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}
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raw := credentialFromRequest(r)
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if raw == "" {
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writeUnauthorized(w)
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return
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}
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role, err := checker.Validate(r.Context(), raw)
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if err != nil {
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writeUnauthorized(w)
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return
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}
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if !isReadOnly(r.Method) && !roleSatisfies(role, mutatingRoleFloor) {
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writeForbidden(w)
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return
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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})
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
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// Package sessioncheck is alerting's half of local login (see
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// api/localauth's package doc comment for the full feature). It only
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// ever validates an already-issued session against the shared
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// local_sessions table api/localauth writes to (same Postgres, no Go
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// import) -- it never handles a raw password, never creates a session,
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// and has no user-management surface at all; that stays exclusively in
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// api. Deliberately its own small package rather than an import of
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// api/localauth: this repo's hard, documented convention is no shared
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// Go store/HTTP code between api and alerting, only /proto (see
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// alerting/internal/httpserver/cors.go's WithCORS doc comment) --
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// duplicating this one hash-and-look-up check is a small, low-risk
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// price for keeping that boundary real.
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package sessioncheck
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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var ErrInvalidSession = errors.New("sessioncheck: invalid or expired session")
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type Checker struct {
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pool *pgxpool.Pool
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}
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func NewChecker(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Checker {
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return &Checker{pool: pool}
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}
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// roleRank duplicates api/authz.Role's rank table -- same "no shared Go
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// code between api and alerting" boundary this package's doc comment
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// already explains for hashToken, applied to the one extra column
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// (role) middleware.go now needs to enforce a floor on mutating
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// requests (see RequireSession).
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var roleRank = map[string]int{"viewer": 1, "editor": 2, "admin": 3, "owner": 4}
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// roleSatisfies reports whether role meets minRole on the same
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// Viewer<Editor<Admin<Owner scale api/authz.Role.Satisfies uses.
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func roleSatisfies(role, minRole string) bool {
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return roleRank[role] >= roleRank[minRole]
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}
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// Validate hashes raw (plain SHA-256, no bcrypt -- see
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// api/localauth/token.go's hashToken doc comment for why a session
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// token doesn't need bcrypt's deliberate slowness) and checks it
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// against local_sessions, returning the session's role snapshot
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// alongside. Returns ErrInvalidSession for both "no such session" and
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// "expired" -- middleware.go's caller doesn't distinguish them either,
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// same posture api/localauth.Store.GetSession already takes for the
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// same two cases.
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func (c *Checker) Validate(ctx context.Context, raw string) (role string, err error) {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
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hash := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
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var expiresAt time.Time
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err = c.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT role, expires_at FROM local_sessions WHERE token_hash = $1`, hash).Scan(&role, &expiresAt)
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if err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
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return "", ErrInvalidSession
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}
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return "", err
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}
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if expiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
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return "", ErrInvalidSession
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}
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return role, nil
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
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// Exercises Checker.Validate against a real local_sessions row --
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// unlike a fake, this confirms alerting can actually read the rows
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// api/localauth (a separate Go module/service) writes into the shared
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// Postgres, including the exact hash function agreeing on both sides.
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// Same "skip unless a live-Postgres env var is set" convention as
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// api/dashboards/store_integration_test.go.
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//
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// Skipped unless SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR is set; run via:
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//
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// docker run --rm --network sentry_default -v $(pwd)/../../..:/src -w /src/alerting \
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// -e SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR=metadata-postgres:5432 \
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// -e SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD=sentry-dev-only \
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// golang:1.25-alpine go test ./internal/sessioncheck/... -run Integration -v
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package sessioncheck
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
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)
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func integrationPool(t *testing.T) *pgxpool.Pool {
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t.Helper()
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addr := os.Getenv("SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR")
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if addr == "" {
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t.Skip("SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR not set -- skipping live-Postgres integration test")
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}
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password := os.Getenv("SESSIONCHECK_TEST_POSTGRES_PASSWORD")
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dsn := fmt.Sprintf("postgres://sentry:%s@%s/sentry_metadata", password, addr)
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pool, err := pgxpool.New(context.Background(), dsn)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("opening pool: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(pool.Close)
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return pool
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}
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// insertTestSession writes directly into local_sessions and users --
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// this package has no Store type of its own (see package doc comment:
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// creating a session is api/localauth's job, this only ever validates
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// one), so a real row has to come from somewhere for the test to check
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// against.
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func insertTestSession(t *testing.T, pool *pgxpool.Pool, ttl time.Duration) (raw string) {
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t.Helper()
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return insertTestSessionWithRole(t, pool, ttl, "viewer")
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}
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func insertTestSessionWithRole(t *testing.T, pool *pgxpool.Pool, ttl time.Duration, role string) (raw string) {
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t.Helper()
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ctx := context.Background()
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userID := uuid.NewString()
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if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO users (id, username, password_hash, display_name, created_at, updated_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, 'unused', $2, now(), now())`,
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userID, "test-"+userID[:8]); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("inserting test user: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _, _ = pool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $1`, userID) })
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buf := make([]byte, 32)
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(userID + role)) // deterministic-enough per-test randomness without crypto/rand here
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copy(buf, sum[:])
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raw = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(buf)
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hashSum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(raw))
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hash := hex.EncodeToString(hashSum[:])
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if _, err := pool.Exec(ctx, `
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INSERT INTO local_sessions (id, user_id, tenant_id, role, token_hash, expires_at)
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VALUES ($1, $2, 'default', $3, $4, $5)`,
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uuid.NewString(), userID, role, hash, time.Now().Add(ttl)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("inserting test session: %v", err)
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}
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return raw
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}
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func TestIntegrationValidateAcceptsRealSession(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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raw := insertTestSession(t, pool, time.Hour)
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role, err := NewChecker(pool).Validate(context.Background(), raw)
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if err != nil {
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t.Errorf("Validate on a real, unexpired session: err = %v, want nil", err)
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}
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if role != "viewer" {
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t.Errorf("role = %q, want %q (matches insertTestSession's role column)", role, "viewer")
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}
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}
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func TestIntegrationValidateRejectsExpiredSession(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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raw := insertTestSession(t, pool, -time.Hour)
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if _, err := NewChecker(pool).Validate(context.Background(), raw); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidSession) {
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t.Errorf("Validate on an expired session: err = %v, want ErrInvalidSession", err)
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}
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}
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func TestIntegrationValidateRejectsUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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if _, err := NewChecker(pool).Validate(context.Background(), "not-a-real-token"); !errors.Is(err, ErrInvalidSession) {
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t.Errorf("Validate on an unknown token: err = %v, want ErrInvalidSession", err)
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}
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}
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// TestIntegrationRequireSessionForbidsMutatingRequestFromViewer is the
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// regression test for the security-audit finding that this middleware
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// used to be a pure "logged in or not" gate: a Viewer-role session
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// could create/delete alert rules and notification targets exactly like
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// an Editor. A POST from a Viewer session must now be 403, not passed
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// through to the handler.
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func TestIntegrationRequireSessionForbidsMutatingRequestFromViewer(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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raw := insertTestSessionWithRole(t, pool, time.Hour, "viewer")
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called := false
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next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { called = true; w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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handler := RequireSession(NewChecker(pool), next)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/targets", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+raw)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Errorf("status = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
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}
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if called {
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t.Error("handler must not run for a Viewer's mutating request")
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}
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}
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// TestIntegrationRequireSessionAllowsMutatingRequestFromEditor is the
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// positive counterpart: an Editor-role session (the new floor) must
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// still be able to reach mutating routes.
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func TestIntegrationRequireSessionAllowsMutatingRequestFromEditor(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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raw := insertTestSessionWithRole(t, pool, time.Hour, "editor")
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next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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handler := RequireSession(NewChecker(pool), next)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/targets", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+raw)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestIntegrationRequireSessionAllowsReadFromViewer confirms the read
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// path is untouched: GET still only needs a valid session, any role.
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func TestIntegrationRequireSessionAllowsReadFromViewer(t *testing.T) {
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pool := integrationPool(t)
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raw := insertTestSessionWithRole(t, pool, time.Hour, "viewer")
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next := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK) })
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handler := RequireSession(NewChecker(pool), next)
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/targets", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+raw)
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("status = %d, want 200", rec.Code)
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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package sessioncheck
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import "testing"
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func TestRoleSatisfies(t *testing.T) {
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cases := []struct {
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role, min string
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want bool
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}{
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{"viewer", "editor", false},
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{"editor", "editor", true},
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{"admin", "editor", true},
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{"owner", "editor", true},
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{"", "editor", false}, // unknown/empty role never satisfies a real floor
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}
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for _, c := range cases {
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if got := roleSatisfies(c.role, c.min); got != c.want {
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t.Errorf("roleSatisfies(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", c.role, c.min, got, c.want)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestIsReadOnly(t *testing.T) {
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if !isReadOnly("GET") || !isReadOnly("HEAD") {
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t.Error("GET/HEAD should be read-only")
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}
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for _, m := range []string{"POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"} {
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if isReadOnly(m) {
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t.Errorf("%s should not be read-only", m)
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}
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}
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}
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user