Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00
parent 9435115ab7
commit 3eb0f4c589
116 changed files with 8589 additions and 126 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-- Extension point named in /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md: one row
+-- per-tenant today (each tenant has exactly one ClickHouse database +
+-- one Tantivy index), not pretending multiple sources per tenant exist
+-- yet -- that's real future work, this table just leaves room for it.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS data_sources
+(
+    id                       UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    tenant_id                TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES tenants(id),
+    name                     TEXT NOT NULL,
+    clickhouse_database_name TEXT NOT NULL,
+    tantivy_index_path       TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at               TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    UNIQUE (tenant_id, name)
+)