Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).

metadata/migrations/0023_add_delivery_log_tenant_id.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-- Same gap and same fix as 0022, for delivery_log.
+ALTER TABLE delivery_log ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS tenant_id TEXT;
+
+UPDATE delivery_log
+SET tenant_id = alert_rules.tenant_id
+FROM alert_rules
+WHERE delivery_log.rule_id = alert_rules.id
+  AND delivery_log.tenant_id IS NULL;
+
+ALTER TABLE delivery_log ALTER COLUMN tenant_id SET NOT NULL