Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00
parent 9435115ab7
commit 3eb0f4c589
116 changed files with 8589 additions and 126 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS tenants
+(
+    id                       TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    display_name             TEXT NOT NULL,
+    -- Provisioning state machine from /docs/phase-4-isolation-design.md:
+    -- every tenant-resolution path must refuse to serve a tenant not in
+    -- 'active' state, checked server-side against this column.
+    status                   TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'provisioning'
+                                 CHECK (status IN ('provisioning', 'active', 'suspended', 'deprovisioning')),
+    clickhouse_database_name TEXT,
+    tantivy_index_path       TEXT,
+    -- Nullable until the first Owner exists -- a tenant can be created
+    -- (provisioning) before any user has logged in to claim ownership.
+    owner_user_id            UUID REFERENCES users(id),
+    created_at               TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    updated_at               TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+)