Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00
parent 9435115ab7
commit 3eb0f4c589
116 changed files with 8589 additions and 126 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users
+(
+    id           UUID PRIMARY KEY,
+    email        TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    display_name TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',
+    -- Set on first successful SSO login (OIDC "sub" or SAML NameID) --
+    -- nullable because a user row can exist before their first login in
+    -- principle (e.g. pre-provisioned by an Admin), though Phase 4's
+    -- baseline flow always creates the row and the SSO subject together.
+    sso_subject  TEXT,
+    created_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    updated_at   TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+)