Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
2026-08-13 22:16:59 -07:00
parent 9435115ab7
commit 3eb0f4c589
116 changed files with 8589 additions and 126 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log
+(
+    id            BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    tenant_id     TEXT NOT NULL,
+    user_id       UUID,
+    source        TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (source IN ('api', 'web', 'cli', 'alerting')),
+    event_type    TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (event_type IN ('query', 'role_change', 'grant_change', 'sso_config_change', 'secret_reveal')),
+    query_text    TEXT,
+    row_count     INT,
+    duration_ms   INT,
+    status        TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('success', 'error')),
+    error_message TEXT,
+    detail        JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
+    prev_hash     TEXT,
+    row_hash      TEXT NOT NULL,
+    created_at    TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+)