Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment
RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage, OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards (no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc. Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden: tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md. Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only -- no cluster was reachable in this environment).
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@@ -73,7 +73,13 @@ Commands:
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--api defaults to $SENTRYCTL_API_URL, or `+defaultAPIURL+` if unset.
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--alerting-api defaults to $SENTRYCTL_ALERTING_API_URL, or `+defaultAlertingURL+` if unset.
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--language overrides auto-detection; omit it for the common case.`)
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--language overrides auto-detection; omit it for the common case.
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$SENTRYCTL_TOKEN, if set, is sent as "Authorization: Bearer <token>" on
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every request -- required once a deployment configures enterprise-auth
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(see /docs/phase-4-rbac-design.md). No flag equivalent, deliberately:
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unlike --api, a credential shouldn't be typed where shell history or
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`+"`ps`"+` output can capture it.`)
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}
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func resolveAPIURL(env func(string) string) string {
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@@ -90,6 +96,14 @@ func resolveAlertingURL(env func(string) string) string {
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return defaultAlertingURL
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}
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// resolveToken reads the RoleService/human bearer credential sentryctl
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// presents to api/alerting once enterprise-auth enforcement is turned
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// on (api/internal/authz.RequireRole*) -- empty by default, matching
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// every other Phase 0-3 client's nil-authorizer no-op behavior.
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func resolveToken(env func(string) string) string {
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return env("SENTRYCTL_TOKEN")
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}
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type errorResponseBody struct {
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Error string `json:"error"`
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}
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