Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).

cli/cmd/sentryctl/cmd_ping.go

@@ -26,8 +26,15 @@ func parsePingArgs(args []string, env func(string) string) string {
 func cmdPing(args []string, stdout, stderr io.Writer) int {
 	apiURL := parsePingArgs(args, os.Getenv)
 
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, apiURL+"/healthz", nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "building request: %v\n", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+	setAuth(req, resolveToken(os.Getenv))
+
 	client := &http.Client{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}
-	resp, err := client.Get(apiURL + "/healthz")
+	resp, err := client.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		fmt.Fprintf(stderr, "ping failed: %v\n", err)
 		return 1