Phase 4: SSO scaffolding, RBAC enforcement, tenant-scoped dashboards, audit logging, K8s deployment

RBAC (api/internal/authz) is live on /query and /dashboards, backed by a
new enterprise/ module (session issuance, audit logging, RBAC storage,
OIDC/SAML protocol wiring) that core never imports -- only calls over
HTTP. Found and fixed a real cross-tenant vulnerability in dashboards
(no tenant_id filtering at all) while writing the threat model doc.

Two things are explicitly NOT done, documented rather than hidden:
tenant isolation for log data itself (/query still shares one ClickHouse
connection and Tantivy index across every tenant -- RBAC controls who
can query, not what a query can see), and human SSO login (protocol
wiring exists, no HTTP handler calls it yet). See
docs/security/threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

Also adds deploy/ (Go Operator + Helm chart, validated offline only --
no cluster was reachable in this environment).

alerting/cmd/alerting/main.go

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ func main() {
 
 	rules := rulestore.NewStore(pgPool)
 	targets := notifystore.NewStore(pgPool)
-	qc := queryclient.New(cfg.APIQueryURL)
+	qc := queryclient.New(cfg.APIQueryURL, cfg.APIServiceToken)
 
 	handler := httpapi.NewHandler(logger, rules, targets, rules)
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()