Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)
ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously), but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail- closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id. ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types, so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either. Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a tenant's own database. Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation -- write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine -mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local verification only. Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs) still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse- gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/ threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -59,8 +59,16 @@ func New(admin driver.Conn) *Provisioner {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ProvisionClickHouse creates tenantID's database and a fresh user for
|
||||
// it, granted SELECT on exactly that database and nothing else.
|
||||
// Database creation is idempotent (CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS --
|
||||
// it, granted SELECT and INSERT on exactly that database and nothing
|
||||
// else -- one credential covers both enterprise/internal/chrunner's
|
||||
// query path and enterprise/internal/chwriter's ingest-write path
|
||||
// (found while building chwriter: the grant here originally covered
|
||||
// SELECT only, which would have made every real per-tenant ClickHouse
|
||||
// write fail with a permission error -- there's no cross-tenant
|
||||
// boundary crossed by also granting INSERT within a tenant's own
|
||||
// database, so a single credential for both directions is the simpler,
|
||||
// still-correctly-scoped choice over provisioning a second write-only
|
||||
// credential). Database creation is idempotent (CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS --
|
||||
// harmless to repeat). User creation deliberately is NOT idempotent
|
||||
// (plain CREATE USER, no IF NOT EXISTS): ClickHouse has no way to read
|
||||
// back an existing user's password, so silently succeeding on a second
|
||||
@@ -108,8 +116,8 @@ func (p *Provisioner) ProvisionClickHouse(ctx context.Context, tenantID string)
|
||||
return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: creating user (already provisioned? this call is not safe to retry): %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if err := p.admin.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("GRANT SELECT ON `%s`.* TO `%s`", database, username)); err != nil {
|
||||
return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: granting select: %w", err)
|
||||
if err := p.admin.Exec(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("GRANT SELECT, INSERT ON `%s`.* TO `%s`", database, username)); err != nil {
|
||||
return Credentials{}, fmt.Errorf("tenantprovision: granting select/insert: %w", err)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return Credentials{Username: username, Password: password}, nil
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user