Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)

ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously),
but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for
ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring
enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with
enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer
registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared
Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by
TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail-
closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id.

ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same
reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import
anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now
take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types,
so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either.

Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse
only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's
read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to
write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a
permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no
cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a
tenant's own database.

Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same
ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation --
write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so
they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a
disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine
-mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active
both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message
via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local
verification only.

Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs)
still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands
in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse-
gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT
regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're
correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/
threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-14 19:26:09 -07:00
parent 17fdc212c2
commit 1de77b969f
26 changed files with 1355 additions and 267 deletions
+22 -11
View File
@@ -139,23 +139,34 @@ escape hatch is opaque to any compiler-injected filter.
ran in the environment it was built in — Tantivy is an embedded
library, so the cross-tenant isolation probe needed no live database
or Docker to execute for real, and it passed.
- **Ingest identity is now built, though write-routing isn't.** `ingest`
(AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
- **Ingest identity and ClickHouse write-routing are now built; Tantivy's
isn't.** `ingest` (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
(`ingest/internal/grpcserver`): an agent presents a per-tenant bearer
credential (`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`
mints one, only its hash stored), validated over the network via a new
`POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint (never an `enterprise/`
import — same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
`api/authz.Authorizer` already uses), and the resolved tenant ID rides
as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header on every record produced. What
isn't built yet: neither `ingest`'s own ClickHouse writer nor
`search`'s independent Redpanda consumer reads that header back to
route the write anywhere per-tenant — every record still lands in the
one shared ClickHouse database and Tantivy index regardless of tenant,
correctly tagged but not yet isolated at write time. That per-tenant
write-routing split is real, scoped remaining work (likely another
"second binary," mirroring `enterprise-api`), not something this
change claims to have closed.
as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header on every record produced.
`enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest` (another "second binary," mirroring
`enterprise-api`) consumes that tag: it reuses `ingest/consumer`'s own
flush loop with `enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry` swapped in as
the writer, routing each batch's records to a per-tenant ClickHouse
connection (one per tenant, built from `rbacstore.
ListProvisionedDataSources` — the same source `chrunner` already uses
for reads), fail-closed on an untagged or unprovisioned tenant.
Building it found and fixed a real bug: `tenantprovision.
ProvisionClickHouse` originally granted a tenant's ClickHouse user
`SELECT` only, which would have made every real per-tenant write fail
with a permission error — fixed by granting `SELECT, INSERT` (one
credential, both directions; no cross-tenant boundary is crossed by
also allowing INSERT within a tenant's own database). What isn't built
yet: `search`'s independent Redpanda consumer (a different codebase —
Rust — and a different process, not reachable through either `ingest`
or `enterprise-ingest`) still writes every record into the one shared
Tantivy index regardless of tenant. That's real, disclosed, separately
scoped remaining work, not something this change claims to have
closed.
- `deploy/operator`'s `Tenant` CRD and `enterprise-api -provision-tenant`
are now unified, deliberately lightweight: `-provision-tenant` stays
the sole real actor (ClickHouse + `rbacstore`), and now also syncs its