Build per-tenant ClickHouse write-routing for ingest (Tantivy still deferred)
ingest tags every record with a tenant_id Kafka header (built previously), but nothing consumed it to actually route the write. This closes that for ClickHouse: enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest (a second binary, mirroring enterprise-api) reuses ingest/consumer's own flush loop unchanged, with enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry -- a per-tenant clickhousewriter.Writer registry -- swapped in as the writer. A batch pulled from the single shared Redpanda topic can mix records from many tenants, so WriteBatch groups by TenantID and dispatches each group to its own tenant's connection, fail- closed on an empty or unrecognized tenant_id. ingest/consumer and ingest/clickhousewriter move out of internal/ (same reason api/internal/* moved earlier this phase: enterprise/ can't import anything under another module's internal/). Their New() constructors now take small local Config structs instead of ingest/internal/config types, so enterprise/ doesn't need that import either. Building this surfaced a real bug: tenantprovision.ProvisionClickHouse only granted SELECT on a tenant's ClickHouse user, correct for chrunner's read-only use but not enough for chwriter reusing the same credential to write -- every real per-tenant write would have failed closed with a permission error. Fixed by widening the grant to SELECT, INSERT; no cross-tenant boundary is crossed by also allowing INSERT within a tenant's own database. Helm gates enterprise-ingest's Deployment on the same ingest.requireTenantCredential flag that already gates tag validation -- write-routing is meaningless without tagging already being required, so they're one decision, not two. docker-compose.yml's version is a disclosed, weaker approximation: it can't achieve Helm's genuine -mode=server/-mode=consumer split, so with the enterprise profile active both ingest and enterprise-ingest independently consume every message via different consumer groups -- harmless duplication for local verification only. Not built: Tantivy's independent Redpanda consumer (search/src/consumer.rs) still doesn't read the tenant_id header at all -- every record still lands in the one shared index regardless of tenant. Not run: the live-ClickHouse- gated tests (chwriter's cross-tenant routing test, tenantprovision's INSERT regression test) -- no Docker/database access in this environment; they're correct Go that has never executed, disclosed as such in docs/security/ threat-model.md and docs/phase-4-runbook.md §14.
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@@ -139,23 +139,34 @@ escape hatch is opaque to any compiler-injected filter.
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ran in the environment it was built in — Tantivy is an embedded
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library, so the cross-tenant isolation probe needed no live database
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or Docker to execute for real, and it passed.
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- **Ingest identity is now built, though write-routing isn't.** `ingest`
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(AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
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- **Ingest identity and ClickHouse write-routing are now built; Tantivy's
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isn't.** `ingest` (AGPL core) gained an optional `TenantResolver`
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(`ingest/internal/grpcserver`): an agent presents a per-tenant bearer
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credential (`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`
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mints one, only its hash stored), validated over the network via a new
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`POST /internal/authorize-ingest` endpoint (never an `enterprise/`
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import — same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape
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`api/authz.Authorizer` already uses), and the resolved tenant ID rides
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as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header on every record produced. What
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isn't built yet: neither `ingest`'s own ClickHouse writer nor
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`search`'s independent Redpanda consumer reads that header back to
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route the write anywhere per-tenant — every record still lands in the
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one shared ClickHouse database and Tantivy index regardless of tenant,
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correctly tagged but not yet isolated at write time. That per-tenant
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write-routing split is real, scoped remaining work (likely another
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"second binary," mirroring `enterprise-api`), not something this
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change claims to have closed.
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as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header on every record produced.
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`enterprise/cmd/enterprise-ingest` (another "second binary," mirroring
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`enterprise-api`) consumes that tag: it reuses `ingest/consumer`'s own
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flush loop with `enterprise/internal/chwriter.Registry` swapped in as
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the writer, routing each batch's records to a per-tenant ClickHouse
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connection (one per tenant, built from `rbacstore.
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ListProvisionedDataSources` — the same source `chrunner` already uses
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for reads), fail-closed on an untagged or unprovisioned tenant.
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Building it found and fixed a real bug: `tenantprovision.
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ProvisionClickHouse` originally granted a tenant's ClickHouse user
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`SELECT` only, which would have made every real per-tenant write fail
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with a permission error — fixed by granting `SELECT, INSERT` (one
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credential, both directions; no cross-tenant boundary is crossed by
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also allowing INSERT within a tenant's own database). What isn't built
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yet: `search`'s independent Redpanda consumer (a different codebase —
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Rust — and a different process, not reachable through either `ingest`
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or `enterprise-ingest`) still writes every record into the one shared
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Tantivy index regardless of tenant. That's real, disclosed, separately
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scoped remaining work, not something this change claims to have
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closed.
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- `deploy/operator`'s `Tenant` CRD and `enterprise-api -provision-tenant`
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are now unified, deliberately lightweight: `-provision-tenant` stays
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the sole real actor (ClickHouse + `rbacstore`), and now also syncs its
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