Give ingest a real tenant identity (write-routing deferred, disclosed)
Ingest tenant-awareness was named "undesigned, not just unbuilt" across CLAUDE.md/threat-model.md/the runbook since early Phase 4 -- the last major standing gap. Scoping was agreed via AskUserQuestion: a config-supplied tenant_id + shared-secret token ingest validates (smaller real implementation, no new PKI), over per-tenant mTLS certs. This change builds that identity mechanism end to end and attaches it to every record at the point it enters the system; it deliberately does NOT build per-tenant write-routing for ClickHouse or Tantivy -- that's real, separately-scoped follow-up work, disclosed explicitly everywhere this was previously called undesigned, not silently left half-done. New pieces: - metadata/migrations/0034 + enterprise/internal/rbacstore/ ingest_credentials.go: a per-tenant bearer credential, only its SHA-256 hash ever persisted (same reasoning a password gets hashed, not stored raw) -- CreateIngestCredential returns the plaintext exactly once, ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential/ ListIngestCredentialsForTenant round it out. - enterprise-auth gains -create-ingest-credential-tenant/ -list-ingest-credentials-tenant/-revoke-ingest-credential (same offline-operator-flag shape as every other credential-minting flag in this binary) and a new POST /internal/authorize-ingest endpoint (internal/authhandler) validating a presented token and resolving its tenant -- a genuinely different credential type from session-backed /internal/authorize, so it doesn't touch session.Manager at all. - ingest (AGPL core) gains an optional TenantResolver (internal/grpcserver, nil by default) and its HTTP client implementation (internal/tenantresolver.HTTPResolver) -- a plain HTTP call to enterprise-auth's new endpoint, never an enterprise/ import, same "network boundary, not import boundary" shape api/authz.HTTPAuthorizer already uses for the query path. PushBatch now requires an `authorization: Bearer <token>` gRPC metadata entry once a resolver is configured, fails the whole batch closed on a missing/invalid credential (never falls back to "no tenant"), and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id` Kafka message header before producing it. Verified with real round trips at every layer, no Docker needed: rbacstore's credential CRUD (skip-gated on live Postgres, same as every other rbacstore integration test this phase), authhandler's new endpoint (real HTTP via httptest, including the regression test that a session token must not validate as an ingest credential), tenantresolver (real HTTP client against httptest, same pattern as authz.HTTPAuthorizer's own tests), and grpcserver's PushBatch (fake resolver/producer -- no resolver leaves messages unchanged, a configured resolver attaches the right header or fails closed on a bad/missing token). Helm: ingest.requireTenantCredential (default false) is a deliberate, separate opt-in from enterprise.enabled -- turning ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL on for ingest requires every agent to already hold a credential or be refused outright, so it must not default on just because enterprise.enabled does (same reasoning api.yaml's ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL isn't tied to enterprise.enabled directly either). docker-compose.yml leaves it unset, same as ever. Docs updated everywhere this was called "undesigned": CLAUDE.md, docs/architecture.md, docs/security/threat-model.md (including its summary table, now split into "identity: built" vs "write-routing: not yet"), docs/phase-4-runbook.md (new §13), enterprise/README.md.
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@@ -554,6 +554,63 @@ all -- a cross-origin `fetch` with credentials from `web`'s origin to
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actual picker UI is real, separately-scoped frontend work; this section
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only closes the backend half.
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## 13. Ingest tenant identity (no per-tenant write-routing yet)
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The identity mechanism was chosen deliberately (config-supplied
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tenant_id + a shared-secret token ingest validates, not per-tenant
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mTLS certs -- smaller real implementation, no new PKI). Verified in
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this environment without Docker or a live enterprise-auth, using the
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same fake-client-at-every-layer discipline as everything else in this
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runbook that doesn't need a live stack:
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```sh
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cd enterprise
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go test ./internal/rbacstore/... -run IngestCredential -v
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# skip-gated (RBACSTORE_TEST_POSTGRES_ADDR) -- CreateIngestCredential/
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# ValidateIngestCredential/RevokeIngestCredential round trip, and the
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# regression test that only a SHA-256 hash is ever persisted, never the
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# plaintext token.
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go test ./internal/authhandler/... -run AuthorizeIngest -v
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# real HTTP round trip against POST /internal/authorize-ingest with a
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# fake credential validator -- proves a session token (service or
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# human) does NOT work as an ingest credential, since this endpoint
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# never calls session.Manager.Validate at all.
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cd ../ingest
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go test ./internal/tenantresolver/... -v
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# real HTTP round trip (httptest), same shape as api/authz.
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# HTTPAuthorizer's own tests -- forwards the bearer token, parses
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# tenant_id, treats a non-2xx or an empty tenant_id as an error.
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go test ./internal/grpcserver/... -run 'Resolver|TenantHeader' -v
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# PushBatch with a fake TenantResolver: no resolver configured ->
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# unchanged behavior, no tenant_id header at all; resolver configured ->
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# every produced Kafka message carries a tenant_id header matching the
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# resolved tenant; missing or invalid bearer token -> the whole batch is
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# refused (codes.Unauthenticated), fail-closed, never falls back to "no
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# tenant."
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```
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**Not built, and explicitly scoped out for now**: per-tenant write
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routing. Neither `ingest/internal/consumer` (the ClickHouse writer) nor
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`search/src/consumer.rs` (a completely independent Redpanda consumer,
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not called through `ingest` at all -- see that file) reads the
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`tenant_id` Kafka header back to route a record's write into a
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per-tenant ClickHouse database or Tantivy index. Every record still
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lands in the one shared destination regardless of tenant, correctly
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tagged but not yet isolated at write time -- see CLAUDE.md and
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`/docs/security/threat-model.md`'s "Read this first" for the full
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disclosure. Also not built: any Helm/`docker-compose.yml` wiring that
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issues an agent a real ingest credential automatically (`enterprise-
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auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>` is, like every other
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credential-minting flag in this codebase, a manual operator action) --
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`deploy/helm/sentry/values.yaml`'s `ingest.requireTenantCredential`
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(default `false`) only turns on *validation*, deliberately not folded
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into `enterprise.enabled` directly, since flipping that flag with no
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agents holding a credential yet would refuse all ingest traffic outright
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rather than degrading gracefully.
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## Known gaps (do not treat this phase as done without reading these)
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Full accounting: `/docs/security/threat-model.md`. Headline items:
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@@ -578,11 +635,17 @@ Full accounting: `/docs/security/threat-model.md`. Headline items:
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that split (declarative request vs. imperative provisioning action)
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is intentional, not the "two disconnected sources of truth" gap this
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bullet used to describe.
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- **Ingest has no tenant concept for either storage engine.** Every
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record `ingest` produces lands in the one shared ClickHouse database
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and the one shared Tantivy index no matter what. A newly-provisioned
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tenant's storage is real, isolated at query time, and permanently
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empty until this changes — undesigned, not just unbuilt.
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- **Ingest now has a real tenant identity (§13), but no per-tenant
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write-routing yet.** An agent presents a bearer credential
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(`enterprise-auth -create-ingest-credential-tenant=<id>`),
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`ingest/internal/grpcserver.TenantResolver` validates it (fail-closed)
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and attaches the resolved tenant ID to every record as a `tenant_id`
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Kafka message header. Nothing downstream reads that header back yet --
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every record still lands in the one shared ClickHouse database and the
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one shared Tantivy index no matter what. A newly-provisioned tenant's
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storage is real, isolated at query time, and permanently empty until
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the write-routing split is built (a real, scoped follow-up, no longer
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an undesigned one).
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- **Human SSO login now works for both OIDC (§3a) and SAML (§3b)** --
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each verified with a real fake IdP (genuine cryptographic signing and
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verification), not yet a real external IdP or a running
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