Take multi-tenancy off the roadmap

Cairn OBS is self-hosted, and the way to separate two environments is to
run two installations rather than two tenants inside one. Tenancy is the
wrong boundary for that, on three counts this repository demonstrates
rather than assumes: chwriter.WriteBatch is all-or-nothing across
tenants, so one tenant's failure stalls offset progress for every other;
CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT puts every tenant's data behind a
single superuser credential, as docker-compose.yml's own comment says;
and one binary with one set of migrations moves every tenant together,
which is the opposite of what separate environments are for. A whole
installation idles at about 1.3 GB, so the sharing buys nothing.

The project led with multi-tenant RBAC in the README banner and in
PROJECT-SPEC's goal statement. Both now say what it is instead:
self-hosted. "Open-core" goes with them -- it was already inaccurate,
since CONTRIBUTING states there is no feature gate and no paid tier, and
with enterprise/ off the roadmap there will not be one.

A second identity provider comes off the list of things standing between
this and production-ready. SSO belongs to enterprise/, and a self-hosted
deployment is not waiting on it. Terraform's tenant/RBAC resources move
from "disclosed future work" to not planned.

Nothing is scrubbed from the record. Phase 4 stays shipped, its runbook
stays, and its known gaps stay stated -- rewriting that history would
contradict the candour the Status section is built on. enterprise/ stays
in the tree, AGPLv3 and working, as the answer to a question this
project is not asking.

Signed-off-by: John Coffey <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-04 18:31:23 -07:00
parent f644825692
commit 0ee2e9183b
5 changed files with 75 additions and 27 deletions
+50 -19
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@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
</p>
<p align="center">
Open-core, Kubernetes-native log aggregation and observability.<br>
Self-hosted, Kubernetes-native log aggregation and observability.<br>
Built to match Splunk on capability while winning on cost-per-GB,<br>
with honest multi-tenant RBAC and a modern language stack.<br>
on a modern language stack.<br>
Positioned against Cribl too — see <a href="docs/positioning.md">positioning</a>
for why that is a different claim, and what it means we still have to build.
</p>
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ web/ SvelteKit frontend
cli/ cairnobsctl
proto/ gRPC service definitions
terraform/ Terraform provider
enterprise/ SSO, multi-tenancy, per-tenant provisioning
enterprise/ SSO, multi-tenancy, per-tenant provisioning (off the roadmap)
deploy/ Helm charts and Kubernetes operator
docs/ Architecture, design docs, per-phase runbooks
hack/ Development scripts
@@ -102,14 +102,11 @@ alerting is on `:8081` and enterprise auth on `:8082`. The agent connects to
ingest over mTLS gRPC on `:4317`. `search` is reachable only on the compose
network — it publishes no host port.
`COMPOSE_PROFILES` in `.env` selects the query-serving binary`single-tenant`
(default) or `enterprise` for the multi-tenant path. They're mutually
exclusive, the same choice Helm's `enterprise.enabled` flag makes for a real
cluster. Override per invocation:
```sh
COMPOSE_PROFILES=enterprise docker compose up
```
`COMPOSE_PROFILES` in `.env` selects the query-serving binary. Leave it at
`single-tenant`: that is the supported shape, and the one every runbook,
the demo and the docs assume. `enterprise` swaps in the multi-tenant
binaries and still works, but it is no longer a direction this project is
taking — see [Multi-tenancy is not the plan](#multi-tenancy-is-not-the-plan).
### Signing in
@@ -187,25 +184,59 @@ privileges. Details in [`agent/README.md`](agent/README.md).
Terraform provider coverage is partial by necessity: dashboards and panels have
full CRUD, while alert rules and notification targets are create/destroy only,
because `alerting` exposes no `PUT /rules/{id}` or `PUT /targets/{id}` to
update against. Tenant and RBAC resources are disclosed future work —
[`terraform/README.md`](terraform/README.md) accounts for exactly what exists.
update against. Tenant and RBAC resources are not planned at all, for the
reason below — [`terraform/README.md`](terraform/README.md) accounts for
exactly what exists.
### Multi-tenancy is not the plan
Phase 4 works, and it is not the direction. Cairn OBS is a self-hosted
system, and the way to separate two environments is to run two
installations, not two tenants inside one.
Tenancy turned out to be the wrong boundary for that job on three counts,
each of which is visible in this repository rather than hypothetical:
- **Shared fate on ingest.** `chwriter.WriteBatch` is all-or-nothing across
tenants by design — one tenant's failed write refuses the whole batch and
stops offset progress for every other tenant. A mistake in one environment
stalls ingestion in the rest.
- **A shared superuser.** `CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT` makes the
admin credential a ClickHouse superuser over every tenant's data, as
`docker-compose.yml`'s own comment spells out. Two environments behind one
credential are not separated in any sense that matters.
- **One upgrade cadence.** A single binary and a single set of migrations
move every tenant together, which is the opposite of what separate
environments are for.
A full installation idles at roughly 1.3 GB — ClickHouse and Redpanda are
almost all of it, and every Go service is 1121 MB — so running one per
environment is cheap enough that sharing a control plane buys nothing. That
is the same argument `positioning.md` already makes about storage, applied
to compute.
So `enterprise/` stays in the tree, AGPLv3 and working, and is not on the
roadmap. It remains the answer for serving other people's data — a question
this project is not asking. Nothing in Phases 8-11 depends on it.
### What would close the gap to production-ready
Named here so the list above reads as a plan rather than an apology, and so
anyone evaluating this knows what they would be waiting for:
1. **A second identity provider.** SSO works against Auth0 for both OIDC and
SAML; one vendor is an implementation, two is a standard.
2. **A real cluster.** The Helm chart has been installed against a local
1. **A real cluster.** The Helm chart has been installed against a local
`kind` cluster, which proves the manifests and nothing about scheduling,
storage classes or node failure.
3. **The Windows agent on Windows.** The code is written and reviewed; no
2. **The Windows agent on Windows.** The code is written and reviewed; no
Windows toolchain has ever compiled it, let alone run it.
4. **Sustained load.** Every phase was verified functionally. Nothing here has
3. **Sustained load.** Every phase was verified functionally. Nothing here has
been run at volume for long enough to find the failures that only show up
after a week.
5. **Somebody else's data.** Every deployment so far has been ours.
4. **Somebody else's data.** Every deployment so far has been ours.
A second identity provider used to head this list. It has come off it: SSO
belongs to `enterprise/`, and with multi-tenancy off the roadmap a second
IdP is no longer something a self-hosted deployment is waiting on.
None of that is research; it is time on real infrastructure. It is also
exactly the list a pilot deployment would work through, which is the honest