Close search's active-tenant write-routing gap with a polled allowlist
search/src/consumer.rs's write-routing (built last pass) had no active- tenant check at all: IndexRegistry.resolve() would open-or-create an index directory for any syntactically-valid tenant_id, active or not -- unlike ClickHouse's chwriter.Registry (an active-tenants-only snapshot built at enterprise-ingest startup) or the read side (gated by searchclient.TenantChecker, a direct rbacstore query). search is AGPL core with no Postgres access and no enterprise/ import allowed, so it needed a network boundary instead -- the same shape ingest's TenantResolver already uses against enterprise-auth, just Rust calling Go instead of Go calling Go. New GET /internal/active-tenants endpoint on enterprise-auth (rbacstore.ListActiveTenantIDs + authhandler.handleActiveTenants), gated on a RoleService Bearer credential -- server-to-server auth, the same shape alerting presents to api, minted via the already-generic enterprise-auth -mint-service-token search. search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker polls it every 60s, blocking startup on the first fetch succeeding (fail-closed cold start -- a control-plane outage at boot must not silently accept every tenant_id) and keeping the last- known-good set on any later refresh failure (a transient blip shouldn't stop every tenant's indexing, only prevent the allowlist from growing/ shrinking until connectivity resumes). consumer.rs refuses any tagged record whose tenant isn't in the polled set, before ever calling resolve() -- IndexRegistry itself stays policy-free, matching the same mechanism/policy split clickhousewriter.Writer vs. chwriter.Registry already draws on the ClickHouse side. Off unless ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN are both set (search/src/config.rs rejects exactly one being set) -- every existing deployment is unaffected. Verified with real HTTP round trips in this environment: tenants.rs's tests exercise real reqwest requests (actual Authorization: Bearer header, actual JSON parsing) against a hand-rolled dependency-free TCP test server, including both fail-closed paths (rejected first fetch, unreachable server). authhandler's new tests cover the credential-kind distinction this endpoint exists to enforce -- a real human session, even for a genuine Owner, must not satisfy a check meant for a service identity. One asymmetry remains, disclosed rather than fixed: chwriter.Registry's snapshot still never refreshes (stale until enterprise-ingest restarts), while ActiveTenantTracker's 60s poll gives Tantivy a materially tighter staleness window. Neither is a live per-write check -- that would mean a database/HTTP round trip per record, a throughput cost neither implementation accepts -- so both have some staleness window by design; the gap between the two windows is what's disclosed, not a claim either is fully live.
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@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ this environment.
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## Package layout
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```
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cmd/enterprise-auth/ config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features/authorize-ingest endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant, -transfer-owner-*, -create-ingest-credential-tenant, -list-ingest-credentials-tenant, -revoke-ingest-credential
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cmd/enterprise-auth/ config loading, OIDC discovery at startup, health/authorize/features/authorize-ingest/active-tenants endpoints, -mint-service-token, -create-tenant, -grant-membership-*, -revoke-membership-*, -list-memberships-tenant, -transfer-owner-*, -create-ingest-credential-tenant, -list-ingest-credentials-tenant, -revoke-ingest-credential
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cmd/enterprise-api/ multi-tenant-aware alternative to api/cmd/api -- see its own doc comment
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cmd/enterprise-ingest/ multi-tenant-aware alternative to ingest -mode=consumer -- see its own doc comment
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internal/tenant/ the ID type -- see its package doc comment before touching it
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@@ -390,6 +390,21 @@ TOKEN=$(docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -mint-service-token=alerting)
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# alerting: set API_SERVICE_TOKEN=$TOKEN and restart
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```
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Same shape for `search`'s write-side active-tenant gate
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(`search/src/tenants.rs` -- see `/search/README.md`'s "Per-tenant
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indices" section):
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```sh
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docker compose up -d enterprise-auth
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SEARCH_TOKEN=$(docker compose run --rm enterprise-auth -mint-service-token=search)
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# search: set ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL=http://enterprise-auth:8082 and
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# ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN=$SEARCH_TOKEN, then restart -- unlike
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# alerting/api above, this doesn't turn on request-level auth
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# enforcement anywhere; it only gates which tenant_ids search will
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# write-route into their own index, refusing anything not in
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# GET /internal/active-tenants' response.
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```
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```sh
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docker build -f Dockerfile -t sentry-enterprise-auth . # context is enterprise/, not the repo root
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```
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