Close search's active-tenant write-routing gap with a polled allowlist
search/src/consumer.rs's write-routing (built last pass) had no active- tenant check at all: IndexRegistry.resolve() would open-or-create an index directory for any syntactically-valid tenant_id, active or not -- unlike ClickHouse's chwriter.Registry (an active-tenants-only snapshot built at enterprise-ingest startup) or the read side (gated by searchclient.TenantChecker, a direct rbacstore query). search is AGPL core with no Postgres access and no enterprise/ import allowed, so it needed a network boundary instead -- the same shape ingest's TenantResolver already uses against enterprise-auth, just Rust calling Go instead of Go calling Go. New GET /internal/active-tenants endpoint on enterprise-auth (rbacstore.ListActiveTenantIDs + authhandler.handleActiveTenants), gated on a RoleService Bearer credential -- server-to-server auth, the same shape alerting presents to api, minted via the already-generic enterprise-auth -mint-service-token search. search/src/tenants.rs's ActiveTenantTracker polls it every 60s, blocking startup on the first fetch succeeding (fail-closed cold start -- a control-plane outage at boot must not silently accept every tenant_id) and keeping the last- known-good set on any later refresh failure (a transient blip shouldn't stop every tenant's indexing, only prevent the allowlist from growing/ shrinking until connectivity resumes). consumer.rs refuses any tagged record whose tenant isn't in the polled set, before ever calling resolve() -- IndexRegistry itself stays policy-free, matching the same mechanism/policy split clickhousewriter.Writer vs. chwriter.Registry already draws on the ClickHouse side. Off unless ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL/ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN are both set (search/src/config.rs rejects exactly one being set) -- every existing deployment is unaffected. Verified with real HTTP round trips in this environment: tenants.rs's tests exercise real reqwest requests (actual Authorization: Bearer header, actual JSON parsing) against a hand-rolled dependency-free TCP test server, including both fail-closed paths (rejected first fetch, unreachable server). authhandler's new tests cover the credential-kind distinction this endpoint exists to enforce -- a real human session, even for a genuine Owner, must not satisfy a check meant for a service identity. One asymmetry remains, disclosed rather than fixed: chwriter.Registry's snapshot still never refreshes (stale until enterprise-ingest restarts), while ActiveTenantTracker's 60s poll gives Tantivy a materially tighter staleness window. Neither is a live per-write check -- that would mean a database/HTTP round trip per record, a throughput cost neither implementation accepts -- so both have some staleness window by design; the gap between the two windows is what's disclosed, not a claim either is fully live.
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@@ -267,17 +267,24 @@ gate a commercially-licensed credential behind, so there was never an
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import-boundary reason to split it out), so read and write share one
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registry directly. The periodic Tantivy commit now commits every tenant
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index that's seen a write, not just the default one
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(`IndexRegistry::commit_all`). **One gap disclosed, not fixed, in this
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same change**: unlike `chwriter.Registry` (built from an
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active-tenants-only snapshot at startup) and unlike the read side (gated
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by `searchclient.TenantChecker`), this consumer's `resolve()` call has
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no active-tenant check — this process has no Postgres access to check
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against, so a still-valid-but-should-be-revoked ingest credential can
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cause an index directory to be created for a tenant that's no longer
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active. Narrow blast radius (an orphan, isolated, empty index — not
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cross-tenant leakage — and only reachable with a real signed
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credential), but real; see `search/src/registry.rs`'s doc comment on
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`resolve`. **The tenant-picker page is now built too**:
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(`IndexRegistry::commit_all`). **The active-tenant gap this same change
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originally disclosed is now closed too**: `search/src/tenants.rs`'s
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`ActiveTenantTracker` polls a new `GET /internal/active-tenants`
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endpoint on `enterprise-auth` (`search` has no Postgres access, unlike
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`chwriter.Registry`'s direct `rbacstore` query or the read side's
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`searchclient.TenantChecker`, so this needed a network call — the same
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"network boundary, not import boundary" shape `ingest`'s
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`TenantResolver` already uses against the same service, authenticated
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with a RoleService credential the same way `alerting` authenticates to
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`api`) and `consumer.rs` refuses any tagged record whose tenant isn't in
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the polled allowlist. Off unless both `ENTERPRISE_AUTH_URL` and
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`ENTERPRISE_AUTH_SERVICE_TOKEN` are set (same "off unless configured"
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default as everything else optional in this codebase); when they are,
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startup blocks on the first fetch succeeding and later refresh failures
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keep serving the last-known-good set rather than clearing it. Verified
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with real HTTP round trips against a hand-rolled TCP test server in this
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environment, no live enterprise-auth needed. **The tenant-picker page is
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now built too**:
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`web/src/routes/select-tenant` calls `GET /auth/memberships`/
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`POST /auth/select-tenant` via `fetch(..., {credentials: 'include'})`
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(new `$lib/api.ts` functions), which needed a second CORS posture
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