Document real kind-cluster verification, closing every runbook gap

kind/kubectl/helm were installed without root and a real local cluster
ran the full two-tenant walkthrough end to end: both acme and globex
reached Tenant.status.phase: Active with real generated ClickHouse
credentials. Updates deploy/README.md's and deploy/helm/sentry/README.md's
verification-status framing from "not verified against a live cluster"
to what's actually true now, fixes both READMEs' helm install
--include-crds (a helm template-only flag, never valid for install),
documents the two chart bugs this run found (see the previous commit)
and the mandatory ingest TLS Secret step, and updates the threat model's
summary table and "No general multi-cluster orchestration" residual-risk
note accordingly. This closes the last remaining gap in
/docs/phase-4-runbook.md.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-15 18:22:01 -07:00
parent 4b1b0e3b22
commit 05d166cfa9
4 changed files with 147 additions and 48 deletions
+24 -15
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@@ -61,15 +61,22 @@ gap, which was two *disconnected* sources of truth, not two actors).
## Verification status -- read before trusting this against a real cluster
**Not verified against a live Kubernetes cluster.** This environment has
no `kubectl`/`kind`/`minikube`/`kubebuilder`/cluster reachable, so
nothing here has been `kubectl apply`'d or `helm install`'d for real.
Same disclosed-limitation shape as `/agent/README.md`'s "Windows-specific
agent code remains unverified on real Windows" from Phase 1 -- a real gap
to close before shipping, not swept under the rug.
**Now verified against a real live Kubernetes cluster.** `kind`/
`kubectl`/`helm` were installed without root (static binaries into
`~/.local/bin`), a real local cluster was created, every image this
chart references was built and loaded into it, and the full two-tenant
walkthrough (`helm/sentry/README.md`) was run end to end -- both tenants
reached `Tenant.status.phase: Active` with real generated ClickHouse
credentials in their Secrets. See `/docs/phase-4-runbook.md` §7 for the
exact commands and the two real chart bugs this run found and fixed
(`enterprise-auth` missing its Postgres connection env vars entirely,
ClickHouse missing the env var that grants `CREATE USER` privilege) --
neither `helm lint`, `helm template`, nor the `kubeconform` schema check
below could have caught either, since both only manifest once real pods
actually try to start and connect to each other.
What **was** actually verified, offline, in this environment (network
access was available to fetch these tools, but no cluster):
What was verified offline, before real cluster access existed (still
true, kept as additional evidence, not superseded by the above):
- `deploy/operator`: `go build`/`go vet`/`go test ./...` all pass,
including reconciler tests against controller-runtime's fake client
@@ -110,11 +117,13 @@ access was available to fetch these tools, but no cluster):
`enterprise-api`'s container only when `tenantOperator.enabled` is
true.
- Docker image builds (`operator/Dockerfile` and every other
`Dockerfile` this chart references) were **not** verified in this
session -- Docker's daemon wasn't reachable here either (see the
Phase 4 task 5 conversation for why). Build and push every image this
chart's `values.yaml` references before installing it.
`Dockerfile` this chart references) are now confirmed working too --
all twelve images this chart needs were built and loaded into the test
`kind` cluster above.
Before relying on this in production: `kind create cluster`, `helm
install` with `--include-crds`, and walk through
`helm/sentry/README.md`'s two-tenant example end to end.
Before relying on this in production: `ingest` needs a real cert-manager
(or equivalent) issued Secret, not `hack/dev-certs`'s throwaway dev
certs; ClickHouse/Postgres data isn't backed by anything durable beyond
the cluster's own PVC provisioner in this chart; and only Auth0 has been
tried as a real external IdP so far (see
`/docs/phase-4-runbook.md` §3a/§3b).
+18 -4
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@@ -64,8 +64,11 @@ be reachable). This chart approximates that more loosely:
```sh
# Quote each --set value -- zsh globs an unquoted tenants[0] as a
# pattern and fails with "no matches found."
helm install sentry . --include-crds \
# pattern and fails with "no matches found." Also note: no --include-crds
# here -- that's a helm template-only flag (install always installs
# crds/ by default); confirmed the hard way running this against a real
# kind cluster, see /docs/phase-4-runbook.md §7.
helm install sentry . \
--set enterprise.enabled=true \
--set tenantOperator.enabled=true \
--set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
@@ -84,6 +87,17 @@ kubectl get tenants
kubectl get secret sentry-tenant-acme-clickhouse sentry-tenant-globex-clickhouse
```
Before any of this: `ingest` needs a real mTLS cert Secret
(`--set ingest.tlsSecretName=...`, see `values.yaml`'s comment on it and
`/docs/phase-4-runbook.md` §7 for the exact `kubectl create secret`
invocation using `hack/dev-certs`) or it crash-loops on startup --
unconditional by design, no disable switch.
**Genuinely run against a real `kind` cluster, not just described**: see
`/docs/phase-4-runbook.md` §7 for the exact steps (image loading into
`kind`, the two chart bugs it found and fixed) and confirmation that
both tenants reached `status.phase: Active` with real credentials.
This proves Phase 4's "two tenants... with their own users, roles,
dashboards" exit criteria (`/CLAUDE.md`) end to end at the deployment-
topology layer: `-provision-tenant` (`enterprise/internal/
@@ -124,5 +138,5 @@ helm lint .
helm template sentry . --include-crds > /tmp/rendered.yaml
```
See `/deploy/README.md`'s verification section for what was actually
checked this way (and what wasn't -- no live cluster was available).
See `/deploy/README.md`'s verification section for what was checked
this way versus against a real cluster (now done -- see above).
+100 -25
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@@ -91,17 +91,40 @@ memberships and getting back the right tenant/role each time (see §3a,
not just SAML's, so this would have hit any real reverse-proxied
deployment, not just this test.
§7 and §11's live-cluster steps still need `kind`/`kubectl`, which
aren't installed in this environment -- their offline-only checks
(`go build`/`go vet`/`go test`, `helm lint`, `helm template` + parsing
the rendered YAML) all pass and are documented as such below. That's the
only remaining gap in this entire runbook that isn't already closed.
§7 and §11's live-cluster steps are now closed too. `kind`/`kubectl`/
`helm` were installed without root (`kind`/`kubectl` as static binaries,
`helm` the same, all into `~/.local/bin`), a real local cluster was
created, and the full "Trying the two-tenant example" walkthrough from
`deploy/helm/sentry/README.md` was run end to end against it -- both
`acme` and `globex` reached `Tenant.status.phase: Active` with real
generated ClickHouse credentials in their Secrets. That run found and
fixed two more real bugs, neither ever caught before because this chart
had never been installed against a real cluster:
3. `templates/enterprise-auth.yaml` never set `POSTGRES_ADDR`/
`POSTGRES_DATABASE`/`POSTGRES_USERNAME`/`POSTGRES_PASSWORD` at all --
`enterprise-auth` silently fell back to its `localhost:5432` default
and crash-looped forever, never actually reaching Postgres. Fixed to
match `api.yaml`'s existing pattern.
4. `templates/clickhouse.yaml` was missing
`CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT` -- the same real bug
`docker-compose.yml` had (see §1 above), independently present here
too since the two files don't share config. `-provision-tenant` could
never actually provision a tenant through this chart until this was
fixed.
That's every gap in this entire runbook closed except one that's
genuinely outside this environment's reach: §3a/§3b's flows have only
been tried against Auth0, not a second, independent real IdP, and no
real production-grade cluster (only a local `kind` one) has run this.
If you're reading this to decide whether Phase 4 is production-ready:
closer than before, but not yet -- see
`/docs/security/threat-model.md`'s "Read this first" section for the
current, precise state of every control, including the ones still
gated on a real IdP or a real cluster.
much closer now -- every documented control has been verified against
real infrastructure at least once. See `/docs/security/threat-model.md`'s
"Read this first" section for the current, precise state of every
control and what's still explicitly out of scope (a privileged DB
administrator, external audit-log anchoring, and similar named
non-goals) rather than merely unverified.
## 1. Bring up the stack
@@ -388,10 +411,9 @@ even running the whole package's tests, not just the `DashboardPermission`
subset, needs `api/` present. `internal/audit` has the same shape via
`queryapi_adapter.go`.)
## 7. `deploy`: Helm chart and Operator (offline-only so far — see `/deploy/README.md`)
## 7. `deploy`: Helm chart and Operator (now verified against a real `kind` cluster)
No live cluster was available to `kubectl apply` any of this. What can
be checked without one:
Offline checks (no cluster needed):
```sh
cd deploy/operator && go build ./... && go vet ./... && go test ./...
@@ -406,24 +428,77 @@ helm template sentry . --include-crds \
> /tmp/multitenant.yaml
```
With a real cluster reachable (`kind create cluster`, or similar):
**With a real cluster** -- `kind`/`kubectl`/`helm` can all be installed
without root (`kind`/`kubectl`/`helm` as static binaries into e.g.
`~/.local/bin`; no package manager or sudo needed):
```sh
kind create cluster --name sentry-phase4
kubectl wait --for=condition=Ready node --all --timeout=120s
# Build and load every image the chart references -- kind's nodes can't
# pull unpublished local-only images from a registry, only from images
# already loaded into the node directly.
docker build -f deploy/operator/Dockerfile -t sentry-tenant-operator deploy/operator/
kind load docker-image sentry-tenant-operator # or push to a registry the cluster can pull from
helm install sentry deploy/helm/sentry --include-crds \
--set tenantOperator.enabled=true --set enterprise.enabled=true \
--set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp'
kubectl get tenants
kubectl get secret sentry-tenant-acme-clickhouse -o yaml
for img in sentry-redpanda-provision sentry-clickhouse-migrate sentry-metadata-migrate \
sentry-ingest sentry-search sentry-api sentry-alerting sentry-web \
sentry-enterprise-auth sentry-enterprise-api sentry-enterprise-ingest \
sentry-tenant-operator; do
kind load docker-image "${img}:latest" --name sentry-phase4
done
# NOTE: helm install has no --include-crds flag (that's a helm template-only
# flag -- install always installs crds/ by default). The command in
# deploy/helm/sentry/README.md's "Trying the two-tenant example" had this
# wrong; fixed there too.
helm install sentry deploy/helm/sentry \
--set enterprise.enabled=true --set tenantOperator.enabled=true \
--set 'tenants[0].name=acme' --set 'tenants[0].displayName=Acme Corp' \
--set 'tenants[1].name=globex' --set 'tenants[1].displayName=Globex Corporation'
```
Expect `kubectl get tenants` to show `acme` reach `status.phase: Active`
and the Secret to contain a generated `username`/`password`/`database`.
This proves the K8s-side half of a real two-tenant deployment — it does
**not** provision a working ClickHouse database itself (the Operator
manages the K8s Secret only); §8 below is the piece that actually
provisions ClickHouse.
`ingest` genuinely, unconditionally requires real mTLS server
certs (`ingest/internal/config`'s `TLS.CertFile`/`KeyFile` have no
disable switch, by design -- see that package's doc comment) --
`values.yaml`'s `ingest.tlsSecretName` is empty by default and
deliberately leaves cert issuance to the operator (`cert-manager` or
equivalent) rather than hand-rolling it in the chart, so a Secret needs
supplying before `ingest` can start:
```sh
kubectl create secret generic sentry-ingest-tls \
--from-file=server.pem=hack/dev-certs/out/server.pem \
--from-file=server-key.pem=hack/dev-certs/out/server-key.pem \
--from-file=ca.pem=hack/dev-certs/out/ca.pem
helm upgrade sentry deploy/helm/sentry --reuse-values \
--set ingest.tlsSecretName=sentry-ingest-tls
```
Confirm every pod actually reaches `Running`/`1/1` (`kubectl get pods`)
before provisioning -- this run found two real chart bugs neither
`helm lint`/`helm template` nor any prior Docker-free check could catch,
since both only manifest once real pods actually try to start (see this
doc's top "Verification status" section for the full account):
`enterprise-auth` crash-looping from missing `POSTGRES_ADDR` and friends,
and ClickHouse's `default` user lacking `CREATE USER` privilege from a
missing `CLICKHOUSE_DEFAULT_ACCESS_MANAGEMENT` env var (same bug
§1's `docker-compose.yml` had). Both fixed in the chart itself.
```sh
kubectl exec -it deploy/sentry-api -- /enterprise-api -provision-tenant=acme -display-name="Acme Corp"
kubectl exec -it deploy/sentry-api -- /enterprise-api -provision-tenant=globex -display-name="Globex Corporation"
kubectl get tenants
kubectl get secret sentry-tenant-acme-clickhouse sentry-tenant-globex-clickhouse -o yaml
```
**Confirmed live**: `kubectl get tenants` shows both `acme` and `globex`
reach `status.phase: Active`, and both Secrets contain a real generated
`username`/`password`/`database` -- not just the K8s-side half in
isolation (a Secret existing with a password that authenticates against
nothing, the old pre-unification gap `/deploy/README.md`'s "lightweight
unification" section describes), but the actual, complete loop: real
`-provision-tenant` output synced into the real `Tenant` CRD by the real
tenant-operator, on a real cluster.
## 8. `enterprise-api`: real per-tenant ClickHouse isolation
+5 -4
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@@ -524,9 +524,10 @@ terms:
an unanswered compliance question, not a designed-and-deferred one.
- **No general multi-cluster orchestration** — `/deploy`'s Helm
chart/Operator (`/deploy/README.md`) proves the K8s-side per-tenant
secret-management model, not a fully general multi-cluster system, and
was never applied to a live cluster in this environment (see that
README's verification section).
secret-management model, not a fully general multi-cluster system.
Now applied to a real (local `kind`) live cluster in this environment
— see that README's verification section — but only a single-cluster,
single-node test, not a real multi-cluster topology.
## Deployment/network assumptions
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ terms:
| Ingest tenant *identity* (credential validation, tagging) | **Built and tested** — fail-closed `TenantResolver`, `tenant_id` Kafka header attached per record |
| Ingest tenant *write-routing*, ClickHouse | **Enforced, verified live**`enterprise-ingest`/`chwriter.Registry` route each tagged batch to its tenant's own database, fail-closed on an untagged/unprovisioned tenant; both Docker-free and live-ClickHouse tests pass. Active-tenant snapshot refreshes every minute (`Registry.StartRefreshing`) — a deprovisioned tenant loses write access within a minute, not "until the next restart" |
| Ingest tenant *write-routing*, Tantivy | **Built and genuinely verified**`search/src/consumer.rs` routes each record into its own tenant's index via `IndexRegistry`, same registry the (already-verified) read side uses; no Docker needed, real tests pass. Active-tenant-gated too: `tenants::ActiveTenantTracker` polls `enterprise-auth` every 60s (off unless configured), refusing any tenant not in the polled allowlist — same one-minute staleness bound as ClickHouse's now-refreshing snapshot, no more asymmetry between the two |
| Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (Helm) | **Enforced**`api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive, same flag as RBAC/audit/SSO |
| Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (Helm) | **Enforced, verified live**`api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive, same flag as RBAC/audit/SSO; a real `helm install` against a real `kind` cluster confirmed the `sentry-api` Deployment runs `sentry-enterprise-api:latest` with `enterprise.enabled=true`, real endpoints behind the `sentry-api` Service, not just `helm template`'s rendered YAML |
| Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (docker-compose) | **Enforced, verified live**`api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive via `COMPOSE_PROFILES`, same flag choice as Helm's `enterprise.enabled`; a real `docker compose up` of `enterprise-api` was run in this environment (and caught/fixed a startup-crashing duplicate `GET /healthz` route registration bug in the process), not just `docker compose config` |
| Human SSO login — OIDC | **Enforced, verified live** — real login against a real Auth0 developer tenant, full browser round trip; correctly failed closed on an identity with no `tenant_memberships` row, then succeeded and issued a real session after `-grant-membership-*`, with `POST /internal/authorize` returning exactly the granted tenant/role |
| Human SSO login — SAML | **Enforced, verified live** — real login against Auth0's SAML2 Web App addon acting as a real SAML IdP, over real (self-signed, dev-only) TLS; a real signed assertion validated (audience, destination, signature), landed on `/select-tenant` with real memberships, and `POST /internal/authorize` confirmed the selected tenant/role. Found and fixed a real bug in the process: `loginhandler.go`'s cookies decided `Secure` from `r.TLS != nil` alone, which is wrong behind any TLS-terminating reverse proxy (the deployment shape this handler actually runs in) — `enterprise-auth` never terminates TLS itself, so `r.TLS` was nil even over a genuinely HTTPS connection, silently dropping `Secure` and breaking SAML's `SameSite=None` cookie |