Document real kind-cluster verification, closing every runbook gap

kind/kubectl/helm were installed without root and a real local cluster
ran the full two-tenant walkthrough end to end: both acme and globex
reached Tenant.status.phase: Active with real generated ClickHouse
credentials. Updates deploy/README.md's and deploy/helm/sentry/README.md's
verification-status framing from "not verified against a live cluster"
to what's actually true now, fixes both READMEs' helm install
--include-crds (a helm template-only flag, never valid for install),
documents the two chart bugs this run found (see the previous commit)
and the mandatory ingest TLS Secret step, and updates the threat model's
summary table and "No general multi-cluster orchestration" residual-risk
note accordingly. This closes the last remaining gap in
/docs/phase-4-runbook.md.

docs/security/threat-model.md

@@ -524,9 +524,10 @@ terms:
   an unanswered compliance question, not a designed-and-deferred one.
 - **No general multi-cluster orchestration** — `/deploy`'s Helm
   chart/Operator (`/deploy/README.md`) proves the K8s-side per-tenant
-  secret-management model, not a fully general multi-cluster system, and
-  was never applied to a live cluster in this environment (see that
-  README's verification section).
+  secret-management model, not a fully general multi-cluster system.
+  Now applied to a real (local `kind`) live cluster in this environment
+  — see that README's verification section — but only a single-cluster,
+  single-node test, not a real multi-cluster topology.
 
 ## Deployment/network assumptions
 
@@ -560,7 +561,7 @@ terms:
 | Ingest tenant *identity* (credential validation, tagging) | **Built and tested** — fail-closed `TenantResolver`, `tenant_id` Kafka header attached per record |
 | Ingest tenant *write-routing*, ClickHouse | **Enforced, verified live** — `enterprise-ingest`/`chwriter.Registry` route each tagged batch to its tenant's own database, fail-closed on an untagged/unprovisioned tenant; both Docker-free and live-ClickHouse tests pass. Active-tenant snapshot refreshes every minute (`Registry.StartRefreshing`) — a deprovisioned tenant loses write access within a minute, not "until the next restart" |
 | Ingest tenant *write-routing*, Tantivy | **Built and genuinely verified** — `search/src/consumer.rs` routes each record into its own tenant's index via `IndexRegistry`, same registry the (already-verified) read side uses; no Docker needed, real tests pass. Active-tenant-gated too: `tenants::ActiveTenantTracker` polls `enterprise-auth` every 60s (off unless configured), refusing any tenant not in the polled allowlist — same one-minute staleness bound as ClickHouse's now-refreshing snapshot, no more asymmetry between the two |
-| Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (Helm) | **Enforced** — `api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive, same flag as RBAC/audit/SSO |
+| Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (Helm) | **Enforced, verified live** — `api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive, same flag as RBAC/audit/SSO; a real `helm install` against a real `kind` cluster confirmed the `sentry-api` Deployment runs `sentry-enterprise-api:latest` with `enterprise.enabled=true`, real endpoints behind the `sentry-api` Service, not just `helm template`'s rendered YAML |
 | Deployment actually routing traffic to `enterprise-api` (docker-compose) | **Enforced, verified live** — `api`/`enterprise-api` are mutually exclusive via `COMPOSE_PROFILES`, same flag choice as Helm's `enterprise.enabled`; a real `docker compose up` of `enterprise-api` was run in this environment (and caught/fixed a startup-crashing duplicate `GET /healthz` route registration bug in the process), not just `docker compose config` |
 | Human SSO login — OIDC | **Enforced, verified live** — real login against a real Auth0 developer tenant, full browser round trip; correctly failed closed on an identity with no `tenant_memberships` row, then succeeded and issued a real session after `-grant-membership-*`, with `POST /internal/authorize` returning exactly the granted tenant/role |
 | Human SSO login — SAML | **Enforced, verified live** — real login against Auth0's SAML2 Web App addon acting as a real SAML IdP, over real (self-signed, dev-only) TLS; a real signed assertion validated (audience, destination, signature), landed on `/select-tenant` with real memberships, and `POST /internal/authorize` confirmed the selected tenant/role. Found and fixed a real bug in the process: `loginhandler.go`'s cookies decided `Secure` from `r.TLS != nil` alone, which is wrong behind any TLS-terminating reverse proxy (the deployment shape this handler actually runs in) — `enterprise-auth` never terminates TLS itself, so `r.TLS` was nil even over a genuinely HTTPS connection, silently dropping `Secure` and breaking SAML's `SameSite=None` cookie |